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INTRODUCTION

Historically, federal judges have had several options when con-

fronted with testimony by a criminal defendant that they believed to
be perjurious. On one hand, the judge could rely on the prosecutor
to file a perjury charge for later trial.' Alternatively, if the judge

thought the perjury was so severe that it rose to a level that obstructed
justice, the judge could find the defendant in contempt of the court
and punish the defendant directly. 2 Complicating the equation, in 1978,

*Dedicated to my wife Sara, my daughter Kelsey, and my entire family for their continued
support and encouragement throughout law school and at every turn in life. Special thanks to
Mark Walker for his tireless efforts as my note advisor and to Professor Elizabeth T. Lear for
introducing me to this topic and for providing advice, insight, and a unique perspective on the
criminal justice system.
1. 18 U.S.C. § 1621(1) (1988) (describing the crime of perjury to include, among other
activities, willfully testifying falsely before a court after taking an oath to testify truthfully).
2. 18 U.S.C. § 401(1) (1988) (empowering courts to punish any misbehavior in the presence
of the court that obstructs justice). This power has been used to punish defendant perjury if
the perjury is obstructive. See infra part II.A.
661
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the Supreme Court declared that a trial judge could use his belief
that a defendant had lied at trial when deciding the proper sentence
for the underlying crime of conviction. The judge could do so because
the alleged perjury was indicative of the defendant's poor prospects
for rehabilitation.3 These approaches are in conflict today as federal
judges have attempted to administer the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines (Guidelines), 4 which provide that a defendant's sentence
must be enhanced for obstruction of justice.5 The Guidelines cite perjury as an example of the type of conduct for which this enhancement
should apply.6
In applying the Guidelines, the majority of the courts of appeals
have allowed, or even required, the obstruction enhancement when a
criminal defendant testifies on his own behalf but is found guilty by
the jury. 7 This note analyzes the current application of the obstruction
enhancement to defendant trial testimony. Part II describes the two
pre-Guidelines options available to courts to punish defendant perjury:
(1) using the contempt sanction to punish perjury that obstructs justice; and (2) considering defendant perjury as an indicator of the defendant's poor prospects for rehabilitation when sentencing for the
underlying conviction offense. Part III reviews the change in sentencing philosophy which accompanied Congress' adoption of the Guidelines
and the split of authority among the courts of appeals concerning the
effect that the new philosophy should have when enhancing Guidelines
sentences for alleged perjury. Part IV argues that, in applying the
Guidelines, the circuits have relied on inapposite case law and have
ignored the historical distinction between simple perjury and perjury
that rises to the level of obstruction. Part IV argues that by ignoring
the historical distinction, the courts have eliminated the need for prosecutors to bring a perjury charge against defendants alleged to have
testified falsely, thus impairing a defendant's right to a trial on the
perjury charge. Finally, Part V proposes a solution to harmonize the
judge's need to control a defendant's behavior and the defendant's
right to present a defense within the structure of the Guidelines.

3.
4.
5.

United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41 (1978); see infra part II.B.
United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual (Nov. 1991).
U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1.

6. Id. cmt. (n.3(b)).
7.

See infra part III.B.
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II. THE PRE-GUIDELINES OPTIONS FOR PUNISHING
DEFENDANT PERJURY

A.

Using Contempt to Punish Perjury that Obstructs Justice

A court has traditionally had the "power to punish by fine or
imprisonment ... such contempt of its authority ... as ... [m]isbehavior of any person in its presence or so near thereto as to obstruct
the administration of justice." s Given the sense of judicial indignation
present when a judge believes that a defendant has committed perjury9 it is not surprising that courts have traditionally sought to
punish perjury as contempt of court rather than awaiting the prosecutor's decision to file a separate perjury charge.
In 1919, Chief Justice White, writing for the Supreme Court in
Ex ParteHudgings,10 stated that "[b]ecause perjury is a crime defined
by law and one committing it may be tried and punished does not
necessarily establish that when committed in the presence of a court
it may not, when exceptional conditions so justify, be the subject
matter of a punishment for contempt."" The Chief Justice then discussed what the exceptional conditions might be that would allow
"justifying punishment under both [contempt and a separate perjury
trial].' 12 He distinguished simple perjury from perjury which also
obstructs the court and held that the court must find the additional
element of obstruction present to punish perjury from the bench as
contempt.' 3 Citing an opinion by Judge Learned Hand, Justice White
maintained that obstruction occurs only in cases in which the alleged
perjury frustrates the court in performing its duty.14

8. 18 U.S.C. § 401 (1988).
9. See United States v. Arbuckle, 48 F. Supp. 537, 537-38 (D.D.C. 1943). The Arbuckle
court called the contempt finding necessary for maintaining respect for the courts. Id. Such
respect would be lost "if itnesses are permitted to give false testimony without both [immediate]
challenge and punishment." Id. However, the court recognized that dealing with this behavior
through the contempt power was proper only if the defendant intended that his testimony block
the court's inquiry, rather than merely to deceive the court. Id.
10. 249 U.S. 378 (1919).
11. Id. at 382.
12. Id. at 383.
13. Id. at 383-84.
14. Id. at 383 (citing United States v. Appel, 211 F. 495 (S.D.N.Y. 1913)). In Appel, Judge
Hand found that a witness' refusal to tell what he knew blocked the inquiry of the court and
constituted obstruction. Appel, 211 F. at 495. Judge Hand warned against using the contempt
power to punish perjury alone, establishing that the test to distinguish between perjury and
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The issue in Hudgings was whether Hudgings' alleged perjury was
egregious enough to rise to the level of obstruction.15 Hudgings
petitioned for habeas corpus after a district court judge found him in
contempt of court for his testimony as a witness at the trial of two
of his co-workers. 16 The prosecution wanted to establish through Hudgings' testimony that the co-workers had written on some documents. 17
Hudgings maintained at trial, under questioning from both the prosecutor and the judge, that he could not recall whether or not he had
ever seen the two co-workers write during the time he worked with
them. 8 When Hudgings finally testified that "I would not say I have
not, but I would not say that I have [seen them write]," the court
announced that it was satisfied that the witness was giving false testimony. The court, with its patience exhausted, found Hudgings in
contempt. 19
The Supreme Court discharged the contempt order, holding that
the judge had imposed the contempt penalty for perjury alone, without
any finding of an obstruction of justice. 29 The Court noted that courts
must avoid the mistake of attributing "a necessarily inherent obstructive effect to false swearing. '' 2 , The Court concluded that Hudgings'
incarceration for contempt was inappropriate, "a conclusion irresistibly
following from the fact that the punishment was imposed for the supposed perjury alone without reference to any circumstance or condition
giving to it an obstructive effect. '"The Hudgings Court reasoned that allowing a judge to punish
perjury alone, without an obstructive effect present, would lead to
situations where the judge might
impose a punishment for contempt with the object or purpose
of exacting from the witness a character of testimony which
the court would deem to be truthful; and thus it would come

contempt was "whether on its mere face, and without inquiry collaterally, the testimony is not
a bona fide effort to answer the questions at all." Id. at 496.
15. Hudgings, 249 U.S. at 383-84.
16. Id. at 379-81. Interestingly, on the same day that Hudgings was held for contempt, he
also was indicted by a grand jury for perjury resulting from his testimony. Id. at 381. Although
he obtained an order releasing him on bail for the peijury charge, he was not released because
he was simultaneously being held on the contempt charge. Id. at 381-82.
17. Id. at 380.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 381.
20. Id. at 384-85.
21. Id. at 384.
22. Id.
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to pass that a potentiality of oppression and wrong would
result and the freedom of the citizen when called as a witness
in a court would be gravely imperiled.?
The Court believed that the perjury-obstruction distinction would prevent judges from pressuring witnesses with the threat of immediate
punishment without trial to provide testimony "deemed truthful" by
the judge. 24 The Court balanced the truth-seeking function of a trial
against the liberty interest of the witness and concluded that the
liberty interest should prevail unless the allegedly perjurious testimony actually obstructed justice. 25
The Supreme Court returned to this theme in In re Michael.26
Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Black further developed the
perjury-obstruction distinction. Justice Black recognized that all perjured testimony creates some difficulty in finding the truth at trial,
noting that all such testimony is "at war with justice" due to the risk
that the testimony could lead to an erroneous outcome. 7 He maintained, however, that perjured testimony does not necessarily obstruct
justice because "the function of trial is to sift the truth from a mass
of contradictory evidence, and to do so the fact-finding tribunal must
hear both truthful and false witnesses." 2 Thus, according to Justice
Black, a judge should expect conflicting testimony at trial, some of
which may be perjurious. Because a trial judge is a professional
factfinder, experienced at gleaning the truth from testimony, simple
perjury by a witness, without more, does not constitute an obstruction
of justice.?
Unlike Hudgings, United States v. Karns" provides an illustration
of perjury rising to the level of obstruction. In Karns, the defendant
was charged with violating an injunction which closed down her bar
as a public nuisance?1 In her defense she testified that she had rented
her building to a person named Rush and no longer assumed responsibility for the building.? In addition to this testimony, she presented

23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Id.
Id.
Id.
326 U.S. 224 (1945).
Id. at 227.

28.

Id. at 227-28.

29.
30.
31.
32.

Id. at 229.
27 F.2d 453 (N.D. Okla. 1928).
Id.
Id.
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a lease signed by Rush and a money order for rent paid. Later,
when developments proved that Rush did not exist and that the lease
and money order had been signed by Karns' bartender, the court
found Karns in contempt.4 Applying the Hudgings distinction between
simple perjury and perjury that obstructs justice, the district judge
noted that the combination of falsified evidence and false testimony
rose to the level of obstruction necessary to permit the judge to punish
Karns for contempt.- The judge maintained that: "[plerjury, while it
may not of itself be punishable as a contempt apart from its obstructive
tendency, yet where it is attended with other circumstances of an
obstructive tendency, inherently affecting and impeding the adminis' ' 36
tration of justice, such is punishable as contempt.
The elaborate but unconvincing defense Karns presented, combining her denial of guilt on the stand with the submission of false evidence, differentiated Karns' offense from simple perjury. Consequently, her perjury placed her within reach of the judge's contempt
power to punish obstruction.37 Applying the Supreme Court's reasoning
in Hudgings to a defendant testifying on her own behalf, the trial
court found that Karns had attempted to block the court's inquiry.3
Karns lied in her testimony and presented false evidence to support
her claim3 9 Without the false evidence, however, her perjurious testimony alone would not have risen to the level of obstruction of justice
required under Hudgings.
Historically, judges could only punish alleged perjury directly when
the perjury exceeded "simple" false testimony and reached the level
of obstruction of justice. 40 The Supreme Court established the distinction between perjury and obstruction to prevent trial judges from
using the threat of a sanction to mold testimony into a form deemed
truthful by that trial judge.41 Recognizing that the differentiation between truthful and false testimony is one of the functions of a trial,
the Court left the prosecutor the discretion to pursue charges for
non-obstructive perjury.42 The limitation on the use of the contempt

33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. See
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. See
41. See
42. See

id.

supra text accompanying notes 8-13.
supra text accompanying notes 23-25.
supra text accompanying notes 26-29.
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power applied both to perjury by witnesses and by defendants testifying on their own behalf." When the defendant as a witness presented
perjurious testimony, however, pre-Guideilnes era judges also viewed
such behavior as a relevant factor when determining the length of the
defendant's sentence for the underlying crime of conviction.B.

Using Perjury to Predict a Defendant's
Prospectsfor Rehabilitation

Prior to the adoption of the Guidelines, judges were permitted to
consider a defendant's alleged perjury when setting the sentence for
the underlying offense of conviction within the broad range available
under the indeterminate sentencing system then in effect. 45 The indeterminate sentencing system acknowledged that the reformation and
rehabilitation of the defendant were the goals of incarceration. 46 Statutes defined broad ranges within which a defendant might be sentenced, and judges were free to select any period within the range
they believed appropriate for a given defendant. 47 Once incarcerated,
a prisoner could be released before serving the entire sentence if the
United States Parole Commission determined that the prisoner had
in fact been rehabilitated."

To arrive at the initial sentence, judges were directed to consider
a variety of defendant characteristics as sentencing factors and were
not required to justify their selection of a certain sentence within the

43. See supra text accompanying notes 38-39.
44. See United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 50 (1978).
45. See id.
46. See Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247-48 (1949) (noting that reformation and
rehabilitation of offenders were important goals of the criminal justice system); see also Ilene
H. Nagel, Structuring Sentencing Discretion: The New Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 80 J.
CRmi. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 883, 892-99 (1990) (recounting the history of the movement away
from retribution and punishment and toward rehabilitation as the goal of imprisonment). Professor Nagel, a member of the Sentencing Commission, traces the origin of the prior indeterminate
sentencing system to 1870. Id. In this system, the judge sentenced a defendant to prison until
such time as he reformed. Id. Prior to 1870, according to Nagel, retribution and punishment
were the aims of incarceration. Id. However, in 1870, the National Congress of Prisons adopted
the view that prisons should be used to reform prisoners, not to punish them. Id. Legislatures
were swept into the reform movement and began to delegate more flexibility in sentence lengths
to judges and corrections departments. Id.
47. See United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 47-48 (1978) (noting the wide discretion
available to the sentencing judge to sentence within the statutory limits depending on various
characteristics of the defendant).
48. Id.
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prescribed range. 49 In United States v. Grayson,5 the Supreme Court
determined that a defendant's alleged untruthful testimony could be
one of the sentencing factors considered by a judge. 51 Grayson upheld
a two-year sentence for a prison escapee. 52 The trial judge's belief
that Grayson's testimony at trial was "a complete fabrication" heavily
influenced this sentence.0 The district judge clearly stated that he
considered Grayson's alleged perjury in determining the sentence.The judge first noted that he had the ability to simply impose any
sentence within the statutory range without stating his reasons for
doing so. 55 However, he then specifically described the alleged perjury
as a sentencing factor in the hope that on review an appellate court
would rule on the constitutionality of that approach.- The Supreme
Court agreed that the defendant's perjury was relevant in sentencing
57
for the underlying crime of conviction.
The Court's opinion in Grayson recounted the evolution of sentencing theories from the early common law, when all felonies were
punished by death, to the more enlightened views behind the indeterminate sentencing system in use when Grayson was decided.5 The
opinion described the movement away from the retribution and punishment theory of sentencing and toward the theory that rehabilitation

49. Id. at 50; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3577 (1976) (codifying the extent of the permissible
inquiry by placing "no limitation" on the information available to a court at sentencing).
50. 438 U.S. 41 (1978).
51. Id. at 50.
52. Id. at 42-45.
53. Id. at 44.
54. Id. The sentencing judge said:
"I'm going to give my reasons for sentencing in this case with clarity, because one
of the reasons may well be considered by a Court of Appeals to be impermissible;
and although I could come into this Court Room and sentence this Defendant to
a five-year prison term without any explanation at all, I think it is fair that I give
the reasons so that if the Court of Appeals feels that one of the reasons which I
am about to enunciate is an improper consideration for a trial judge, then the
Court will be in a position to reverse this Court and send the case back for
re-sentencing.
... [I]t is my view that your defense was a complete fabrication without the
slightest merit whatsoever. I feel it is proper for me to consider that fact in the
sentencing, and I will do so."
Id. (quoting the district judge).
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 50-51, 55.
58. Id. at 45-49.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol44/iss4/4

8

Hazzard: Oh What a Tangled Web We Weave when First We Practice to Deceive
FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES

of the offender was not only attainable, but was the primary goal of
incarceration. 59 The Court noted that judges should impose sentences,
keeping in mind the defendant's potential for rehabilitation.6
Because the Grayson Court found rehabilitation to be the primary
purpose of incarceration, the Court allowed the sentencing judge to

conduct a broad, virtually unlimited inquiry into the defendant's behavior and background to determine his potential for rehabilitation s1
Viewed from this perspective, the Court reasoned that the lack of

truthfulness in testifying was legitimately considered as an indication
of a defendant's poor prospects for rehabilitation.- Logically, a defen-

dant with poor rehabilitation prospects would require a longer period
of incarceration in which to become rehabilitated.6 The Court held,
therefore, that the sentencing judge was justified in allowing his belief
that Grayson committed perjury during the trial to influence the length
of the sentence imposed.6
Although the Grayson Court upheld the sentencing judge's use of
the defendant's perjurious testimony as indicative of his rehabilitative

prospects, the Court cautioned against requiring a judge to enhance
sentences automatically whenever a defendant allegedly testifies untruthfully.6 The Court viewed the defendant's false testimony as one
factor among many to be used in assessing the defendant's "prospects

for rehabilitation and restoration to a useful place in society."

The

59. Id.
60. Id. at 47-48.
61. Id. at 50.
62. Id. at 55. The Court found Grayson's untruthfulness especially telling because the trial
court had'categorized his lies as 'lagrant." Id. at 52.
63. Id. at 55.
64. Id. The Grayson Court encouraged the sentencing judge to evaluate the defendant's
false testimony in light of other information available about the defendant, rather than automatically increasing the defendant's sentence because he testified untruthfully. Id. The Court's
decision built upon its earlier decision in Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949), wherein
the Court upheld a state court decision to sentence the defendant to death in spite of a jury
recommendation of life imprisonment. Id. at 241-42. The Court upheld the death sentence
because the pre-sentence report indicated that the defendant had committed thirty uncharged
burglaries in the same vicinity as the murder, had "a morbid sexuality" and was a 'menace to
society." Id. at 244. The Williams Court noted that, at sentencing, restrictions on a judge's
ability to learn pertinent information about the defendant would undermine the sentencing goals
of reformation and rehabilitation of criminals. Id. at 248-50. The Court, however, did not explain
how Williams would be either reformed or rehabilitated by his execution. Williams application
to death penalty cases has since been overruled. Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349 (1977).
65. Grayson, 438 U.S. at 55.
66. Id.
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Court also noted that perjury is a separate, chargeable offense and
recognized that enhancing a sentence merely to save the government
the trouble of bringing a subsequent perjury charge would be an
"impermissible sentencing practice.67 However, to the extent that the
perjury was indicative of rehabilitation prospects, the Court recognized
the permissible practice of enhancing the sentence while guarding
against the "impermissible practice" of circumventing the right to a
jury trial on a perjury charge.6
Prior to the development of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines,
alleged perjury by a criminal defendant could be confronted and
punished in three ways: by criminal perjury charges filed by the prosecutor, by the judge using the contempt of court power if the perjury
also obstructed justice, and as a factor considered by the judge in
setting the defendant's sentence if the perjury was indicative of the
defendant's prospects for rehabilitation. 69 The three options were not
necessarily exclusive of each other. Conceptually, at least, a defendant
could be punished for contempt by the judge, prosecuted on a separate
perjury charge for the same behavior, and find the perjury factored
into the final sentence for the crime of conviction. To evaluate what
impact, if any, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines have had on these
options, it is helpful to examine the basis upon which the Guidelines
were developed.
III.

THE NEW ERA OF GUIDELINES SENTENCING

A.

Development of the Guidelines

The Sentencing Reform Act of 198470 created the Federal Sentencing Commission (Commission)' 1 to establish policies and practices for
criminal sentencing in the federal courts.7 2 The legislation developed
in response to the perceived inequities of the indeterminate sentencing
system which, due to the nearly unfettered discretion of the sentencing

67.

Id. at 53.

68.

Id.

69. See supra text accompanying notes 1-3.
70. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (1984) (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3580, 3601-3625, 3661-3673; 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998 (1988)).
71. 28 U.S.C. § 991 (1988). The Commission is an agency within the judicial branch with
seven voting members and one nonvoting, ex officio member. Id. § 991(a). At least three
Commissioners must be federal judges and no more than four Commissioners may be members
of the same political party. Id. The Attorney General or his designee serves as the ex officio
member. Id.
72. Id. § 991(b).
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judge, had created unacceptable disparities in sentences among similarly situated offenders.7 The rationale behind the indeterminate system - that prisoners would be rehabilitated, reformed, and returned
to a useful place in society - also fell into disrepute. 74
Sentence disparity combined with disenchantment with the rehabilitative ideal led to the abandonment of the indeterminate system
in favor of more structured guidelines which would recognize new
purposes for incarceration: just punishment, deterrence, and incapacitation. 7s Further addressing the disparity issue, Congress directed the
Commission to eliminate the consideration of many personal characteristics of offenders, which had been regularly considered in sentencing under the indeterminate system.7 s As a result, the Commission

produced the Guidelines and submitted them for congressional review.7 The Guidelines went into effect on November 1, 1987. 78
The Guidelines narrow judicial sentencing discretion by defining a
formulaic procedure for sentencing. 79 Determining a Guidelines sen-

73.

See

MARVIN

E.

FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER 12-25

(photo. reprint 1991) (1972) (demonstrating sentence disparity through personal anecdotes and
concluding that the indeterminate system resulted in the loss of vital checks and balances on
the power of judges); ANTHONY PARTRIDGE & WILLIAM B. ELDRIDGE, THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SENTENCING STUDY, A REPORT TO THE JUDGES OF THE SECOND CIRCUIT (1974) (noting
wide sentencing disparities in a series of hypothetical cases presented to the judges); Developments in the Law - Race and the Criminal Process, 101 HARv. L. REV. 1472 (1988); Joseph
C. Howard, Racial Discriminationin Sentencing, 59 JUDICATURE 121 (1975); see also S. REP.
No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 38 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3220, 3221 (noting
that, under the indeterminate system, criminals with similar histories and crimes were sentenced
in an "unjustifiably wide range" and received "widely differing prison release dates"); cf. Gerald
W. Heaney, The Reality of Guidelines Sentencing: No End to Disparity, 28 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 161 (1991) (arguing that the Guidelines have not eliminated the disparity of the previous
system because sentencing factors may be manipulated).
74. See Nagel, supra note 46, at 896-97.
75. U.S.S.G. ch. 1, pt. A, intro. cmt. 2 notes that the purposes of punishing criminal
conduct include deterrence, incapacitation, just punishment, and rehabilitation. However, 18
U.S.C. § 3582 (1991) abandons incarceration as an inappropriate means of promoting rehabilitation.
76. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(e) (1988) (mandating that the Guidelines "reflect the general inappropriateness of considering the education, vocational skills, employment record, family ties and
responsibilities, and community ties of the defendant").
77. U.S.S.G. ch. 1, pt. A, intro. cmt. 2.
78. Id. For general commentary on the Guidelines development process, see Nagel, supra
note 46, at 913-32; see also Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key
Compromises upon Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1 (1988) (discussing how practical
needs influenced the compromises).
79. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1.
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tence begins with a focus on the penalty for the basic crime charged.80
Then, the sentencing judge uses her view of the defendant's overall
behavior during the planning and execution of the crime as well as
during the defendant's journey through the judicial process to make
incremental sentence adjustments.sl To arrive at an appropriate sentence accounting for the defendant's overall behavior, a judge may
consider conduct for which a defendant has not been indicted or convicted and may even consider crimes for which the defendant has been
acquitted by a jury.- Challenges to the reliance on behavior for which

80. Id. § 1B1.1(b).
81. Id. § 1B1.1; see also U.S.S.G. ch. 1, pt. A, intro. cmt. 4(a) (calling the Guidelines as
submitted a charge offense system with "a significant number of real offense elements" included
in the sentence determination).
The inclusion of real offense elements has prompted much comment from academics and
judges. See, e.g., Michael Tonry & John C. Coffee, Jr., Enforcing Sentencing Guidelines: Plea
Bargaining and Review Mechanisms, in ANDREW VON HIRSCH ET AL., THE SENTENCING
COMMISSION AND ITS GUIDELINES

142, 152-63 (1987) (reviewing the real offense model in the

context of guidelines systems in general); Breyer, supra note 78, at 8-12 (reviewing the Comniission's reasons for including real offense elements in the system); Heaney, supra note 73, at 228
(contending that the Guidelines have not eliminated disparity because real factors may be manipulated, that the relevant conduct provisions violate due process by requiring judges to sentence
for uncharged or unproven criminal acts, and recommending that an "offense-of-conviction model
...replace the modified real offense model adopted by the Sentencing Commission"); Richard
Husseini, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Adopting Clear and Convincing Evidence as the
Burden of Proof, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1387 (1990) (arguing that the importance of factual
determinations of real factors should require a higher burden of proof at sentencing); Nagel,
supra note 40, at 925 n.228 (describing reasons for relying on modified real offense model);
Stephen J. Schulhofer, Assessing the Federal Sentencing Process: The Problem of Uniformity,
Not Disparity, 29 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 833, 848-50 (1992) (responding to Heaney's criticism and
rejecting Heaney's version of an offense-of-conviction model); Stephen J. Schulhofer & Ilene H.
Nagel, Negotiated Pleas Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: The First Fifteen Months,
27 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 231, 272-84 (1989) (assessing the extent to which prosecutors manipulate
sentences by withholding evidence of real conduct through fact and charge bargaining); Stephen
J. Schulhofer, Due Process of Sentencing, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 733, 757-72 (1980) (discussing
the difficulties in relying on real offense model to control prosecutorial power at sentencing);
Michael H. Tonry, Real Offense Sentencing: The Model Sentencing and CorrectionsAct, 72 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1550 (1981) (rejecting real offense sentencing on constitutional and
policy grounds before the adoption of the Guidelines); William W. Wilkins, Jr. & John R. Steer,
Relevant Conduct: The Cornerstone of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 41 S.C. L. REV. 495
(1990) (discussing decision to include key provision incorporating real offense concept); Note,
An Argument for Confrontation Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 105 HARV. L. REV.
1880 (1992) (contending that defendants should enjoy a right to confrontation at sentencing given
the impact of real factors on the ultimate sentence).
82. United States v. Rivera-Lopez, 928 F.2d 372 (11th Cir. 1991) (allowing the drug quantity
alleged in an acquitted possession charge to be used when calculating the sentence for a different
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a conviction has never been secured or for which a defendant was
acquitted have been unsuccessful,3 largely because the federal courts
have drawn a critical distinction: the court is not punishing the defendant for the unconvicted conduct; rather, the court is enhancing the
defendant's sentence for the offense of conviction based on factors that
distinguish the defendant's crime from others.84

possession conviction if acquittal quantity established by preponderance of the evidence); see
also United States v. Manor, 936 F.2d 1238, 1243 (11th Cir. 1991) (applying preponderance
standard at sentencing to base sentence in part on acquitted conduct); United States v. Rodriguez-Gonzalez, 899 F.2d 177 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 844 (1990) (allowing acquitted
conduct in the sentencing calculation over defendant's claim of both due process and double
jeopardy violations); United States v. Dawn, 897 F.2d 1444, 1450 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 498
U.S. 960 (1990) (allowing enhancement for firearms used in a bank robbery despite a jury's
acquittal on a charge of using a firearm during the robbery); United States v. Mocciola, 891
F.2d 13 (1st Cir. 1989) (allowing firearm enhancement despite acquittal on weapons possession
charge); United States v. Juarez-Ortega, 866 F.2d 747 (5th Cir. 1989) (allowing handgun possession acquittal to be considered in sentencing on cocaine distribution counts). But see United
States v. Brady, 928 F.2d 844, 851 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that the Guidelines do not "permit
a court to reconsider facts during sentencing that have been rejected by a jury's not guilty
verdict").
83. See, e.g., Rivera-Lopez, 928 F.2d at 372 (rejecting a challenge asserting that the use
of acquitted conduct at sentencing is contrary to the foundation of our judicial system, is a
denial of due process and usurps the jury's role); Rodriguez-Gonzalez, 899 F.2d at 182 (allowing
the use of acquitted conduct over a double jeopardy challenge because the Guidelines did not
change the practice as established in pre-Guidelines cases and over a due process challenge
because it is well established 'that disputed sentencing factors need only be proved by a preponderance of the evidence to satisfy due process"); Mocciola, 891 F.2d at 17 (allowing the use of
acquitted conduct in sentencing because the jury's not guilty verdict did not mean that the
conduct was "clearly improbable," but "simply means that the government did not meet its
considerable burden under the reasonable doubt standard"); United States v. Ryan, 866 F.2d
604 (3d Cir. 1989) (affirming the use of acquitted conduct in sentencing over a challenge suggesting such use was inconsistent with the Guidelines by noting its use in pre-Guidelines cases and
interpreting the Guidelines to allow that practice to continue); United States v. Isom, 886 F.2d
736, 738 (4th Cir. 1989) (dismissing a due process challenge to the use of acquitted conduct at
sentencing because it was based on the '"awed" assumption that the acquittal established the
defendant's innocence); Juarez-Ortega, 866 F.2d at 749 (allowing the use of acquitted conduct
at sentencing despite the argument that its use overrode the jury's factual determination because
the acquitted conduct was not used to punish for the acquitted offense, "but to justify the
heavier penalties for the offenses for which [defendant] was convicted"); United States v.
McGhee, 882 F.2d 1095, 1098 (6th Cir. 1989) (allowing sentence enhancement for uncharged
firearms possession over a due process challenge that the enhancement violated the Sixth Amendment jury trial right because "n]ot all factors that bear on punishment need to be proven before
a jury"); United States v. Restrepo, 884 F.2d 1294 (9th Cir. 1989) (allowing enhancement for
uncharged firearms possession over an argument that the Guidelines impermissibly shift the
burden of proof to the defendant to show no connection between the firearm and the offense
of conviction because the Guidelines do not require that any connection at all be shown, but
merely require that the firearm be possessed during the offense of conviction).
84. See e.g., United States v. Mobley, 956 F.2d 450, 457 (3d Cir. 1992) (noting that
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In developing the Guidelines, the Commission gave each offense
in the federal system a numerical "base offense level.",, Various incremental changes to the base level result from specific offense characteristics, such as the quantity of drugs involved in a drug violation,s
the degree of bodily harm caused to a victim, 8 7 or the use of a firearm

during a crime.8 Adjustments are also made if a defendant willfully
obstructs or impedes justice 89 or recklessly endangers another person
while fleeing from a law enforcement officer ° The base offense levels,
numbered 1 through 43, then combine with six criminal history
9
categories 9 to form a 258-box grid known as the sentencing table. 2
Each box in the grid contains a sentence range, expressed in months,
within which the judge is free to sentence the defendant without
further explanation.

9

3

defendant's argument "seeks to blur the distinction among a sentence, sentence enhancement,
and definition of an offense"); Mocciola, 891 F.2d at 17 (noting that the defendant's argument
"misperceives the distinction between a sentence and a sentence enhancement"); Juarez-Ortega,
866 F.2d at 749 (noting that "[t]he sentencing court was not relying on facts disclosed at trial
to punish the defendant for the extraneous offenses, but to justify the heavier penalties for the
offense for which he was convicted"). But see Elizabeth T. Lear, Is Conviction Irrelevant?, 40
UCLA L. REv. 1179 (1993) (criticizing the use of the traditional distinction as "no substitute
for constitutionality" and arguing that an incremental increase in the defendant's sentence for
a separate offense, absent a conviction is unconstitutional).
85. U.S.S.G. § 2.
86. U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 (establishing the base level according to the weight of the drugs
involved in the crime). The process for calculating the weight of the drugs has been criticized
for including the weight of the "carrier medium" in addition to the weight of the drug itself.
See Albert W. Alschuler, The Failureof Sentencing Guidelines:A Pleafor Less Aggregation,
58 U. CHi. L. REv. 901, 919 (1991). Alschuler notes that wide and unjustifiable variations in
sentences occur between a drug dealer who chooses to deliver a quantity of LSD in sugar cubes
versus a dealer who delivers the same amount of the drug on blotter paper or in gelatin capsules
or the pure drug. Id. at 919. Professor Alschuler argues that the variation is unjustified because
it is based on the weight of the carrier medium and not the weight of the proscribed drug itself.
Id.
87. See, e.g., U.S.S.G. § 2A2.2 (providing a base level of 15 for aggravated assault, increased
by 2 levels if bodily injury occurred, 4 levels for serious bodily injury, and 6 levels for permanent
or life-threatening bodily injury).
88. See, e.g., U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1 (establishing a base offense level of 20 for robbery, increased
by 7 levels if a firearm was discharged, 6 levels if a firearm was otherwise used, and 5 levels
if a firearm was brandished, displayed, or possessed).
89. U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1.
90. U.S.S.G. § 3C1.2.
91. U.S.S.G. § 4Al.l(a)-(f).
92. U.S.S.G. ch. 5, pt. A; see infra app. (containing a copy of the sentencing table).
93. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(b)(2) (1988) (providing that the maximum sentence in the range
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Section 3C1.1 authorizes enhancements for alleged defendant perjury by instructing sentencing judges to add two levels to the defendant's base offense "score" if the defendant "willfully obstructed or
impeded, or attempted to obstruct or impede, the administration of
justice during the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of the in-

stant offense." 94 The Guidelines' application notes suggest that this
two-level upward adjustment applies for obstructing justice by, among
other things, "committing, suborning, or attempting to suborn perjury. ''95 Adding two levels to the base offense score for obstruction

through alleged perjury may add from less than one year to almost
seven years to a sentence, depending upon the defendant's criminal
history and the severity of the crime of conviction.9 The Guidelines

do not require indictment or trial on the alleged violation of the federal
perjury statute.9 The court may simply enhance the sentence for the

underlying crime of conviction if it finds that the defendant obstructed
justice by committing perjury at trial.98
B.

Applying the Obstruction Enhancementfor Alleged Perjury

To date, all the courts of appeals have addressed challenges to the
Guidelines perjury enhancement, although the Third Circuit has yet

cannot exceed the minimum sentence by more than 25% or six months, whichever is greater).
Commissioner Nagel describes this as 'the tolerable level of disparity acceptable to Congress"
for those convicted of the same crime with the same criminal history. Nagel, supra note 46, at

933.
94. U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1.
95. U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, cmt. (n.3). Application note three provides a "non-exhaustive" list
of examples of conduct that warrant use of the two-level enhancement. Id. In addition to perjury,
the note suggests applying the enhancement for influencing witnesses, co-defendants, or jurors;
for entering false or altered documents into a proceeding;, for destroying or concealing evidence;
and for escaping from custody or failing to appear for a proceeding and other similar acts. Id.
96. See infra app. For a defendant in criminal history category I with a base offense level
of 10, raising the base offense level to 12 for perjury increases the sentence range by 4 months,
from 6-12 months to 10-16 months. Id. At the other extreme, in criminal history category VI,
a base offense level of 34 enhanced to 36 for perjury raises the sentence range from 262-327
months to 324-405 months, an increase of between 5 and 6.5 years. Id.
97. 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (1988). Interestingly, the maximum penalty for the federal crime of
perjury is a $2000 fine and imprisonment for five years. Id. However, the enhancement for
perjury under the Guidelines could add more than five years to the sentence of certain defendants.
See supra note 96.

98. Courts have also added the two-level enhancement for obstruction of justice when
defendants have allegedly lied at their sentencing hearing, United States v. Franco-Torres, 869
F.2d 797 (5th Cir. 1989), at other hearings related to the defendant's case, United States v.
Austin, 948 F.2d 783 (1st Cir. 1991), and to probation officers preparing a pre-sentence report,
United States v. Christman, 894 F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1990).
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to address the enhancement as applied in the context of a defendant's
testimony at trial.9 Of the circuits that have addressed the enhancement in the trial testimony setting, the Fourth Circuit stands alone
in disallowing the enhancement, holding that it places an impermissible
and unconstitutional chill on the defendant's right to testify."°° The
remaining circuits have upheld the constitutionality of the perjury
enhancement against a variety of challenges. Several circuits maintain
that the adoption of the Guidelines had no effect on the sentencing
judges' pre-Guidelines ability to consider perjury in sentencing, as
approved in Grayson, and consider the enhancement as merely the
embodiment of pre-Guidelines case law. 10 Other circuits dispense with
the argument that the enhancement chills a defendant's right to testify
by relying on the Grayson Court's statement of the simple truism
that "there is no [constitutionally] protected right to commit perjury.""o0
United States v. Wallace"13 illustrates the continued use of Grayson
to justify the perjury enhancement under section 3C1.1. In Wallace,
a jury convicted the defendant of attempted possession of marijuana
with intent to distribute and of using the telephone in connection with
a felony."°" The trial court enhanced Wallace's sentence by two levels
for obstructing justice, believing that his testimony at trial was false."°On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit maintained that the district court's
failure to identify specific instances of false testimony by Wallace did

99. United States v. Thompson, 962 F.2d 1069 (D.C. Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 61 U.S.L.W.
3620 (U.S. Mar. 8, 1993); United States v. Collins, 972 F.2d 1385 (5th Cir.), petition for cert.
filed, 61 U.S.L.W. 3446 (U.S. Dec. 7, 1992) (No. 92-964); United States v. Becker, 965 F.2d
383 (7th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 61 U.S.L.W. 3619 (U.S. Mar. 8, 1993); United States v.
Batista-Polanco, 927 F.2d 14 (1st Cir. 1991); United States v. Bonds, 933 F.2d 152 (2d Cir.
1991); United States v. Dunnigan, 944 F.2d 178 (4th Cir. 1991), rev'd, 113 S. Ct. 1111 (1993);
United States v. Barbosa, 906 F.2d 1366 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 961 (1990); United
States v. Beaulieu, 900 F.2d 1537 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 1009 (1990); United States
v. Wallace, 904 F.2d 603 (11th Cir. 1990); United States v. Acosta-Cazares, 878 F.2d 945 (6th
Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 899 (1990); United States v. Wagner, 884 F.2d 1090 (8th Cir.
1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1088 (1990).
100. Dunnigan, 944 F.2d at 185.
101. See Wallace, 904 F.2d at 605; Beaulieu, 900 F.2d at 1539; Acosta-Cazares, 878 F.2d
at 953.
102. Grayson, 438 U.S. at 54; United States v. Casanova, 970 F.2d 371, 378 (7th Cir. 1992);
Collins, 972 F.2d at 1414; Batista-Polanco,927 F.2d at 22; Bonds, 933 F.2d at 155.
103. 904 F.2d 603 (11th Cir. 1990).
104. Id. at 604.
105. Id.
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not warrant reversal. 106 Reviewing Wallace's testimony in the record,

the Eleventh Circuit found it "replete with internal contradictions"
and "substantially inconsistent with the evidence put forward by the
government.''

7

The court noted that evidence in the record clearly

contradicted the defendant's testimony that he had not previously
bought or sold marijuana. 10 The evidence also supported the conclusion
that the defendant was not truthful when testifying about his intent
to purchase marijuana from a government informant. 1°9 On that basis,
the Eleventh Circuit concluded that the defendant's testimony was
perjurious and warranted application of the two-level enhancement
for obstruction of justice. 110
The Eleventh Circuit noted that the Guidelines' perjury enhancement was merely the embodiment of pre-Guidelines case law, interpreting Grayson to hold that defendants who give false testimony
under oath deserve greater punishment for doing so.' The court then
cited Grayson's language that the willingness to lie under oath was
indicative of a defendant's poor prospects for rehabilitation."1 However, the court's -assertion that Grayson allowed harsher sentences
for defendants who testify falsely is arguably a mischaracterization of
Grayson. Grayson's false testimony per se did not justify a harsher
sentence.'1 ' Rather, Grayson's false testimony gave an indication about
his rehabilitative prospects, thus justifying his increased punishment. 14 The Wallace court added another element to the Grayson
formula by suggesting that defendants believed to have testified falsely
deserve greater punishment because of the false testimony itself rather
than because of their demonstrably poor rehabilitation prospects."15
The court recognized that the obstruction enhancement should not
attach in every situation where a defendant denies guilt. For example,
the Wallace court held that judges could not enhance a defendant's
sentence "simply because he or she pleads not guilty, thereby requiring
the government to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the allegations

106. Id. at 605.

107.
108.
109.
110.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

111.

Id. at 604.

112. Id. at 604-05.
113.
114.
115.

See supra notes 61-68 and accompanying text.
See id.
Wallace, 904 F.2d at 604.
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in the indictment."116 The court maintained that the plea of not guilty
is a constitutional right "for which no increased punishment is permis7
sible."1
Similarly, in United States v. Bennett,118 the Sixth Circuit upheld
enhancement for defendant perjury when a jury convicted the defendant of possession of a firearm and ammunition by a convicted felon.119
Bennett and his girlfriend were involved in an accident while riding
in the girlfriend's car on a rural road.120 The girlfriend, who was driving
the car, left the scene to get help. 121 When a police officer arrived,
he found Bennett sitting in the car, intoxicated, and holding a pistol.
The officer also found several other weapons and ammunition in the
car. 12 At trial, both Bennett and his girlfriend testified that the guns
and ammunition belonged to the girlfriend.'- In spite of the testimony,
the jury found Bennett guilty on both counts.- The judge added two
levels to Bennett's base offense score at sentencing because the judge
believed Bennett obstructed justice by lying under oath.'2
On appeal, Bennett challenged the sentence enhancement for perjury, arguing that the jury's verdict and his testimony were consistent
since the jury could have believed that the firearms belonged to the
girlfriend and still found the defendant guilty of simply possessing
them. 126 Bennett further asserted that application of the perjury enhancement has a chilling effect on a defendant's constitutional right
to testify and proclaim his innocence before the jury. 127 On review,
the Sixth Circuit noted that the district court had fully evaluated the
evidence, rather than simply relying on the jury's verdict, before
concluding that Bennett perjured himself.'2 In deciding to assess the

116. Id.
117. Id.
118. 975 F.2d 305 (6th Cir. 1992).
119. Id. at 306; see also 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (1988) (making it a crime for anyone convicted
of a crime punishable by more than one year in prison to possess any firearm or ammunition).
120. Bennett, 975 F.2d at 306.
121. Id. at 307.
122. Id. at 306.
123. Id. at 307.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 308.
127. Id. For a thorough discussion of the effect that use of the perjury enhancement has
on a defendant's right to testify, see Peter J. Henning, Balancing the Need for Enhanced
Sentences for Perjury at Trial Under Section 3C1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines and the
Defendant's Right to Testify, 29 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 933 (1992).
128. Bennett, 975 F.2d at 308.
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enhancement for obstruction of justice "the [trial] court observed that
penalizing the defendant for perjury 'was a policy which was in effect
before the sentencing guidelines' and applied the enhancement to the
defendant.m The Sixth Circuit held that its own careful review of the
transcript revealed that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
applying the two-level enhancement.130 The court further noted that
the sentencing court has broad discretion under the Guidelines to
decide "whether [the] defendant's perjury amounts to an obstruction
of justice.''3
United States v. Bonds illustrates a situation where a court inferred
perjury only from the combination of the defendant's testimony and
a guilty verdict. 3 2 A jury convicted Bonds on three counts for knowingly passing counterfeit currency."' In his testimony, Bonds denied
knowing that the money he distributed was counterfeit."" The district
court concluded that this testimony was false and applied the two-level
sentence enhancement for perjury."5 On appeal, the Second Circuit
held that the jury verdict of guilty on a charge of knowingly passing
counterfeit currency "necessarily determined that Bonds knew that
the money he had distributed was counterfeit" unless the verdict was
unsupported by the evidence, which would warrant reversal of the
conviction." 36 This meant that Bonds' testimony was "objectively false,"
because the testimony concerned Bonds' state of mind. 1 7 The court
cautioned that its decision should not be interpreted to authorize the
perjury enhancement every time a defendant is found guilty after
testifying on his or her own behalf. 1" However, the court further
noted that when the "defendant's testimony relates to an essential
element of his offense, such as his state of mind or his participation
in the acts charged in the indictment, the judgment of conviction
necessarily constitutes a finding that the contested testimony was
false." 9 Arguably, this caveat leaves very little ground upon which

129.

Id.

130. Id.
131. Id.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

933 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1991) (per curiam).
Id. at 153.
Id. at 155.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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a defendant might testify without fearing that a conviction by the jury
will automatically lead to a court's conclusion that the defendant's
140
testimony was perjurious.
Only the Fourth Circuit has rejected the obstruction enhancement
as applied to a defendant's trial testimony, calling it "an intolerable
burden upon the defendant's right to testify in his own behalf.' 1 4' In
United States v. Dunnigan, the defendant was convicted of one count
of conspiracy to distribute cocaine.1 2 Six other persons were similarly
charged, five of whom pleaded guilty.'" The government presented
these five as witnesses against Dunnigan during the government's
case in chief.'" All five described various drug transactions in which
they participated with Dunnigan, including trips they made with her
to purchase cocaine. 145 Dunnigan's entire defense was her testimony
offering a blanket denial of everything alleged by the government's
witnesses.1
During cross-examination, the prosecution asked Dunnigan about
a specific sale of crack cocaine to Edward Dickerson on a specific date,
which Dunnigan also denied.147 In rebuttal, the government produced
Edward Dickerson, who testified that he had previously been arrested
and had become a government informant. 48 Dickerson testified further
that despite Dunnigan's denial, he had in fact purchased crack cocaine
from her in a monitored transaction. 14 Dunnigan was convicted, and
the court enhanced her sentence under section 3C1.1 based upon her
false testimony under oath when she denied all involvement in the
50
crimes charged.
On review, the Fourth Circuit abandoned the views of the other
circuits that used Grayson to justify the perjury enhancement.' s' The

140. Id. In this regard, the court noted that when the defendant's testimony relates to
matters that do not determine the defendant's guilt or innocence, it "would ordinarily be an
insufficient basis for imposing" the enhancement based on a judgment of conviction alone. Id.
at 155.
141. Dunnigan, 944 F.2d at 185.
142. Id. at 179.
143. Id. at 179-80.
144. Id. at 180.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 181.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. See id. at 183.
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court maintained that the abandonment of the rehabilitation goal for
incarceration and the adoption of the Guidelines rendered the Grayson
decision inapplicable. 1 2 The court examined Grayson closely and found

that the Guidelines "have removed important underpinnings of the
[Supreme] Court's analysis."'1 The Dunnigancourt observed that the
justification for enhancing the sentence in Grayson and the justification
for the perjury enhancement found in the Guidelines are entirely different."' While the enhancement in Grayson relied on the defendant's
rehabilitation prospects, the Fourth Circuit maintained that the
Guidelines impose the perjury enhancement based on the defendant's
obstruction of justice."' Calling the testimony of the accused in his
own defense "basic to justice," the court found it disturbing that such
testimony may be "deemed to 'obstruct' justice unless the accused
convinces the jury."' This conclusion, in the view of the court, was
unpalatable."57 Therefore, the Fourth Circuit remanded the case for
sentencing without the section 3C1.1 enhancement for perjury.'
The Dunnigan court feared that sentences could be enhanced automatically whenever a defendant is found guilty after testifying on
his or her own behalf. 59 In fact, at oral argument the government
claimed that the perjury enhancement should be given whenever the
jury convicts a defendant who has testified on his or her own behalf."'
The court agreed that, in terms of consistent application of the
Guidelines, the government's argument was persuasive. 61 In fact, the
court conceded that when a jury returns a guilty verdict in spite of
a defendant's testimony claiming innocence, the logical conclusion "implies a disbelief of some material aspect of the defendant's testimony." " However, the court was unwilling to infer that false testimony potentially drawn from every guilty verdict could be expanded
to justify application of the perjury enhancement."'

152.

See id. at 184.

153.
154.

Id.
Id.

155.

Id.

156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

Id. at 183.
Id.
Id. at 185.
Id. at 183.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id.; see also United States v. Beaulieu, 900 F.2d 1531, 1536 (10th Cir.), cert.
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The Supreme Court in Grayson noted that "[t]here is no protected
right to commit perjury," suggesting that chilling perjury was not
objectionable.- Other courts, meanwhile, have stated that guilt is
properly denied by pleading not guilty while not under oath. 16 In
contrast, the Dunnigancourt maintained that the fear that the perjury
enhancement might be applied if a defendant were found guilty, in
spite of his testimony, would add to a growing list of factors that a
1
defendant must consider when deciding whether or not to testify. '
The Dunnigan court noted that an innocent defendant with a record
must already weigh the probable, though impermissible, inference of
guilt from not testifying against the potential for impeachment by
prior conviction if he does testify. 167 The court feared that by causing
defendants to consider, when deciding whether to testify, the possibility that failure to convince the jury would lead to an increased sentence, the balance would tip against testifying. 16 The court concluded
that this would not be a desirable outcome because the overall ends
of justice are better served by allowing a defendant to testify at trial. 6 9
IV.

APPLICABILITY

OF

THE

PRE-GUIDELINES

RATIONALES

UNDER THE GUIDELINES

A.

Misplaced Reliance on Grayson

Relying on Grayson to support sentence enhancements for perjury
under the Guidelines is susceptible to three criticisms. First, it is clear
that the rehabilitation goal that formed the basis for the decision in
Grayson plays no role in sentencing under the Guidelines today. 170
Next, while the Court in Grayson held that automatically increasing

denied, 447 U.S. 1009 (1990). The Fourth Circuit may not stand alone in its reluctance to make
the enhancement automatic when a defendant who testifies is convicted. In upholding the perjury
enhancement, the Beaulieu court noted that "[t]he general jury verdict against the defendant
who here testified would not have been alone enough to demonstrate false testimony." Id.
164. Grayson, 438 U.S. at 50.
165. United States v. Acosta-Cazares, 878 F.2d 945, 953 (6th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493
U.S. 899 (1990); see also Wallace, 904 F.2d at 603.
166. Dunnigan, 944 F.2d at 183-84.
167. Id. at 184; see FED. R. EVID. 609.
168. Dunnigan, 944 F.2d at 185.
169. Id. The court was also concerned that appellate review of the decision to enhance for
perjury would become an empty exercise. Id. The court reasoned that, considering the jury's
finding of guilt, the decision to add the enhancement could never be considered clearly erroneous.
Id.
170. See infra text accompanying notes 179-84.
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sentences when a defendant commits perjury is inappropriate, some
of today's courts rigidly mandate the application of the Guidelines
enhancement whenever perjury is alleged. 171 Finally, while Grayson
cautioned that enhancing a defendant's sentence for perjury simply to
save the trouble of a separate perjury trial was an impermissible
purpose, 17 subsequent decisions have undermined this caution.'1'
Today, the Grayson decision is used to assert that a judge may enhance
a sentence for perjury and bypass a trial on a perjury charge, 74 because
no constitutional right to commit perjury exists.
With respect to the first criticism, the disappearance of rehabilitation as a primary purpose behind sentencing has been well
documented.1 5 In rejecting the initial constitutional challenge 76 to the
Guidelines system in Mistrettav. United States," the Supreme Court
stated clearly that rehabilitation was not a goal of incarceration under
the Guidelines. 78 In Mistretta, the Court charted the history of the
indeterminate sentencing system that preceded the adoption of the
Guidelines."7 The Court noted that a basic premise of indeterminate
sentencing was that rehabilitation was the best way to minimize the
risk that a criminal would repeat his behavior after serving his sentence. 180 However, the Mistretta Court recognized congressional disappointment with indeterminate sentencing because of two basic flaws
in the system: (1) similarly situated defendants appeared to receive
widely disparate sentences;' 8 ' and (2) rehabilitation was not an obtainable goal.1'2
The Mistretta Court reviewed the legislative history leading to the
Guidelines' explicit rejection of rehabilitation as a goal of imprisonment. By comparison, it found that the goals of imprisonment under

171. See infra notes 198-206 and accompanying text.
172. Grayson, 438 U.S. at 53.
173. See infra notes 207-09 and accompanying text.
174. See infra text accompanying notes 207-09.
175. See FRANCIS A. ALLEN, THE DECLINE OF THE REHABILITATIVE IDEAL (1981); see
also supra notes 73-76 and accompanying text.
176. See SENTENCING COMMISSION, 1989 U.S. ANN. REP. 11 (noting that 200 federal
judges declared the Guidelines unconstitutional during the first year of operation).
177. 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
178. Id. at 365.
179. Id. at 363-67.
180. Id. at 363.
181. Id. at 366.
182. Id. at 365.

183.

Id. at 367.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1992

23

Florida Law Review, Vol. 44, Iss. 4 [1992], Art. 4
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44

the Guidelines are retribution, incapacitation, deterrence, and education. 1 Sentences under the Guidelines system, unlike those under the
indeterminate system, are designed to fit the crime circumstances
generally, rather than the criminal personally, by focusing on specified
factors related to the crime. 18 Logically, then, it is inappropriate to
use information bearing on a particular defendant's prospects for rehabilitation, such as perjury at trial, in determining the sentence.'s
Grayson approved the use of a defendant's false testimony at trial
to enhance his sentence because of the negative indication the false
testimony gave regarding the defendant's prospects for rehabilitation. 187 Mistretta confirmed the rejection of rehabilitation as a goal of
incarceration under the Guidelines.,- If Congress rejected the rehabilitation goal that formerly supported increasing sentences when a defendant committed perjury, pre-Guidelines case law rationale that relied
on the rehabilitation goal can, therefore, no longer justify the enhancement for perjury under the Guidelines.
The second criticism of courts that use Grayson to justify the
perjury enhancement is that, while the Grayson Court stressed flexibility and discretion in sentencing, application of the perjury enhancement today approaches the very rigidity Grayson cautioned against.
The Grayson court advised that nothing in its decision required a
sentencing judge "to enhance, in some wooden or reflex fashion, the
sentences of all defendants whose testimony is deemed false."'' In
fact, the rehabilitative theory underlying the Grayson decision mandated individual sentences for individual offenders, rather than wooden
and reflexive application of standards.19

184. Id.
185. Id. at 368; see also United States v. Mejia-Orosco, 867 F.2d 216, 218-19 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 492 U.S. 924 (1989) (maintaining that Guidelines sentencing is based on two factors,
the offense committed and the defendant's criminal history, without consideration of the defendant's prospects for rehabilitation).
186. See United States v. Ogbeifun, 949 F.2d 1013, 1014-15 (8th Cir. 1991) (Heaney, J.,
concurring) (calling for the circuit to convene en banc to consider whether applying the two-level
perjury enhancement for false testimony at trial is ever appropriate). Judge Heaney recognized
that many circuits allow the enhancement by relying on Grayson, but maintained that Grayson
is no longer applicable because of the Guidelines' abandonment of rehabilitation as a goal in
sentencing. Id.
187. Grayson, 438 U.S. at 52.
188. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 365.
189. Grayson, 438 U.S. at 55.
190. Id. The Grayson Court noted that one drawback to the indeterminate model was "how
rationally to make the required predictions [about rehabilitation potential] to avoid capricious
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The Guidelines, however, are designed to remove the individual
tailoring of sentences to offenders. 191 Rather than allowing individual
offender characteristics to affect punishment, the new sentencing
structure attempts to treat like offenses alike, without regard to
characteristics of the offenders. 92 In United States v. Mejia-Orosco, 93
the Fifth Circuit noted that the Guidelines impose a framework intended to create uniform sentences.'9 While cautioning that the
Guidelines were not intended to make sentencing an exact science,
the Mejia-Orosco court also pointed out that Congress approved the
discretion and to insure that similar crimes
Guidelines to limit judicial
195
are similarly punished.

With respect to section 3C1.1 enhancements, however, some courts
interpret the Guidelines' language to indicate that judges are without
discretion in applying the two-level increase when they believe a defendant committed perjury. For example, the First Circuit, in United
States v. Austin, 19 held that the district court was required to apply
the two-level enhancement if the court found that the defendant had
lied when testifying. 19' In Austin, the sentencing judge had declined
to impose the perjury enhancement on the defendant because the
judge believed the defendant's testimony was such a poor effort to
fool the court that it stood absolutely no chance to succeed. 198 The
Government appealed the judge's refusal to apply the enhancement
to the defendant's sentence. 199 Approving the Government's interpretation, the First Circuit held that, once the district court noted the
defendant's alleged perjury, the Guidelines mandated the two-level
enhancement for obstruction.2
The First Circuit's Austin decision is echoed by the Sixth Circuit's
decision in United States v. Alvarez.m20 In Alvarez, the Sixth Circuit

and arbitrary sentences, which the newly conferred and broad discretion placed within the realm
of possibility." Id. at 48.
191. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
192. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
193. 867 F.2d 216 (5th Cir. 1990).
194. Id. at 219.
195. Id. at 218-19.
196. 948 F.2d 783 (1st Cir. 1991).
197. Id. at 789.
198. Id. at 788. The sentencing judge also noted that the defendant committed perjury
before a judge, not a jury. Id.
199. Id. at 784.
200. Id. at 789.
201. 927 F.2d 300 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2246 (1991).
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noted that the district court had found that '[the defendant] lied
openly, continuously, [and] almost ridiculously before the jury. ' MDue
to this finding, the appeals court ruled that the district judge was
without discretion under the Guidelines and had to apply the two-level
sentencing enhancement.20 Thus, it appears that many courts rigidly
apply the perjury enhancement, in direct contrast to the cautions
given by the Grayson Court about the automatic and mechanical use
2
of perjury to increase a sentence.

°

04

The third criticism of the application of Grayson to Guidelines
perjury enhancement cases is that, absent the rehabilitative purpose,
the Grayson Court cautioned that incarceration in order to save the
trouble of a subsequent perjury trial was impermissible °5 The Court
justified the increase in Grayson's sentence for perjury solely as an
indicator of Grayson's poor rehabilitation prospects, as distinguished
from punishment for a crime without trial which the Court indicated
would violate Grayson's due process rights.2 0 Naturally, at least from
Grayson's perspective, this was a distinction without a difference.
However, with the abandonment of rehabilitation as a purpose behind
incarceration, the rehabilitation rationale supporting Grayson, its permissible purpose, no longer stands. Left standing from Grayson is the
"impermissible sentencing practice of incarcerating for the purpose of
saving the Government the burden of bringing a separate and sub'' 2
sequent perjury prosecution. 07

The continued use of the pre-Guidelines Graysonrationale to justify
sentence enhancement is demonstrably misplaced because of the
Guidelines' abandonment of rehabilitation as a goal of incarceration.2
In addition, courts have rigidly applied the sentence enhancement for
perjury, contrary to the view expressed by the Grayson Court.20

202. Id. at 303 (quoting the district court).
203. Id.
204. Grayson, 438 U.S. at 55. Courts are not unaware of the Grayson caution against
"wooden and reflex" use of defendant perjury in sentencing. See United States v. Lozoya-Morales,
931 F.2d 1216 (7th Cir. 1991). In Lozoya-Morales, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals vacated
a perjury enhancement and held that use of the jury's guilty verdict to infer that a defendant's
testimony was perjurious was precisely the type of wooden and reflex adjustment warned against
in Grayson. Id. at 1219. However, the court allowed the judge on remand to apply the perjury
enhancement if the judge made an independent finding that the defendant's testimony was
perjurious. Id. at 1219-20.
205. Grayson, 438 U.S. at 53.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. See supra text accompanying notes 179-84.
209. See supra notes 198-206 and accompanying text.
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Arguably, courts now appear to apply the enhancement in lieu of a
separate trial for the crime of perjury, which the Grayson Court
explicitly warned against as a violation of a defendant's due process
rights. 210 Yet, in spite of these problems, the Fourth Circuit stands
alone in rejecting the perjury enhancement as an intolerable burden
to the defendant's right to testify on his own behalf.211 However, in
rejecting the perjury enhancement outright, the Fourth Circuit, as
well as the courts that mandate application of the enhancement to all
instances of defendant perjury, have ignored the historical practice of
allowing judges to punish perjury that rises to the level of obstruction
of justice through contempt of court.
B. Ignoring the Perjury-ObstructionDistinction
The historical use of the contempt charge when perjury is deemed
to have obstructed justice could explain the willingness of most judges
to accept the Guidelines sentence enhancement for perjury. That is,
perhaps it seems natural to judges to punish perjury committed right
before their eyes. The court believes it is justified in punishing a
defendant for committing perjury because perjury offends the court's
sensibilities.21 2 However, the pre-Guidelines case law draws a distinction between perjury, which is a separate, chargeable offense, and
perjury that obstructs justice, which the judge may punish sua
sponte.213 That historical distinction has been lost under the Guidelines.
The Guidelines' application note, which lists perjury as an example of
the type of conduct which causes sentence enhancement, has overwhelmed the rule itself, which actually aims at punishing the "obstruc''
tion of justice. 214
Analyzing the pre-Guidelines Supreme Court decisions that originally established the legal distinction between simple perjury and
obstructive perjury, the Seventh Circuit concluded that "[p]erjury by
a witness has been thought to be not enough where the obstruction
to judicial power is only that inherent in the wrong of testifying

210. See supra text accompanying note 68. Interestingly, since the adoption of the
Guidelines, there are no reported appellate decisions involving charges under the federal perjury

statute for perjurious trial testimony by a defendant.
211.

See United States v. warren, 973 F.2d 1304, 1309 (6th Cir. 1992) (joining the First,

Second, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits in declining to follow Dunnigan).
212.
213.
214.

See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
See part II.A.
See U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, cmt. (n.3).
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falsely. ' 21 This view of perjury is vastly different from that of the
Sixth Circuit which applied the Guidelines perjury enhancement in
United States v. Alvarez.216 The Sixth Circuit interpreted the
Guidelines commentary as mandating that "where a defendant testifies
untruthfully concerning a material fact, he should be deemed obstructing justice. '' 217 It seems that under the Guidelines, the words perjury
and obstruction have become synonymous, despite the historical differentiation between the two.
It is quite possible to maintain the Guidelines perjury enhancement
and avoid losing the distinction between perjury and obstruction. For
example, United States v. Keys,2 18 a post-Guidelines case, illustrates
how the Guidelines obstruction enhancement might be applied in light
of the simple perjury-obstruction distinction. In Keys, Michael Keys
was charged and convicted of possessing a weapon while he was incarcerated at a federal prison.2 19 The crux of Keys' defense was his testimony that the weapon had been planted on him without his knowledge . 0 Apparently recognizing the weakness in his case, Keys wrote
a letter to another inmate, Molina, asking Molina and two other inmates to testify falsely that a guard had threatened and abused Keys,
thus creating the inference that the guard had planted the weapon on
Keys.2'2 However, the government intercepted the Molina letter and
included the letter along with the suggestion that Keys gave false
testimony when the government requested the obstruction of justice
enhancement for perjury.- The Tenth Circuit upheld the two-level
enhancement because the district judge had personally observed the
false testimony and because of Keys' letter requesting Molina's perjurious assistance to defeat the charge.2
Although the Tenth Circuit did not employ the distinction between
simple perjury and obstructionist perjury and, in fact, merely quoted
Grayson in noting that "[tihere is no protected right to commit perjury," 2? the decision in Keys to add the perjury enhancement would

215.
Clark v.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.

United States ex rel. Johnson v. Goldstein, 158 F.2d 916, 920 (7th Cir. 1947) (quoting
United States, 289 U.S. 1, 11 (1933)).
927 F.2d 300 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2246 (1991).
Id. at 302.
899 F.2d 983 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 858 (1990).
Id. at 985.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 989.
Id. at 988 (quoting Grayson, 438 U.S. at 54).
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not be altered using the historical distinction analysis. Keys did not
merely testify falsely; he attempted to suborn perjury from two other
persons as well.15 Suborning perjury, combined with his own false
testimony, could support a determination that Keys' efforts were an
attempt to block the inquiry of the court and therefore rose to the
level of obstruction.
In other cases, however, using the criteria that perjury must rise
to a higher level before the Guidelines enhancement applies, alleged
false testimony by a defendant should be left to punishment by a
separate perjury charge, rather than through a sentence enhancement.
For example, enhancements such as those given to Bennett, for asserting that the firearms in the car belonged to his girlfriend, 22 6 or to
Bonds, for denying that he knew the money he distributed was counterfeit, are inappropriate.m In those cases, the court used the testimony of the defendant alone in imposing the enhancement.m Viewing
the distinction as articulated by Chief Justice White,2 Justice Black, 210
Judge Learned Hand,m" and others,m neither of those cases contains
that added element necessary to raise perjury to the level of obstruction.
This historical approach is similar to that attempted by the trial
judge in United States v. Austin,m who found perjury, but refused
to enhance Austin's sentence because the defendant's attempt to mislead the court was doomed to failure. 23 Clearly, the judge in Austin
did not believe that justice was obstructed by the perjured testimony.
However, the First Circuit ruled that the judge was without discretion
and was forced to apply the obstruction enhancement because perjury
was present.2 This reasoning is reminiscent of the lower court's ruling
in Hudgings that was subsequently overturned by the Supreme Court
because "the punishment was imposed for the supposed perjury alone
without reference to any circumstance or condition giving to it an

225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.

Id. at 985.
See supra notes 118-30 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 132-40 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 118-40 and accompanying text.
See supra text accompanying notes 10-13.
See supra text accompanying notes 26-29.
See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
See supra text accompanying notes 35-36.
948 F.2d 783 (1st Cir. 1991).

234.
235.

Id. at 788.
Id. at 788-89.
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obstructive effect. ''2- 6 It would appear that the trial judge in Austin
was able to "sift the truth from a mass of contradictory evidence"
without difficulty. Thus, applying the standards articulated by Justice
Black in In re Michael,23 the perjury in Austin would not rise to the
obstruction of justice level and would not warrant an enhancement.
An approach that more fully incorporates the obstructionist perjury
definition also fits within a plain meaning interpretation of Guidelines
section 3C1. 1. The language of section 3C1. 1 speaks only to obstruction
of justice. 239 It is the application notes to the section that include
perjury among the list of factors to be considered in administering
the enhancement. 24°
Courts and prosecutors have seized upon perjury alone as the element that triggers application of the enhancement. Once a court determines that a defendant lied about any matter at any point in the
process, the defendant receives a two-level sentence enhancement.
Combining the well established point that perjury does not obstruct
justice in and of itself with a plain meaning interpretation of the
statute leads to the conclusion that something more than a finding
that the defendant committed perjury in testifying is needed to justify
the enhancement under section 3C1.1.
V.

CONCLUSION

Current interpretations of the Guidelines perjury enhancement
create major constitutional problems and should be abandoned. Several
arguments support this conclusion. First, Grayson is inapposite the Guidelines marked the clear abandonment of the indeterminate
sentence and the rehabilitative ideal. Justifications for the enhancement are not supportable under Grayson's rationale. Second, punishment for the crime of perjury absent indictment and trial violates due
process and ignores the warning issued by the Grayson Court to

236.

Hudgings, 249 U.S. at 384.

237. Michael, 326 U.S. at 227.
238. See supra text accompanying notes 26-29.
239. U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1.
240. U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, cmt. (n.3). The application notes provide additional guidance, including the caution that the obstruction enhancement provision "is not intended to punish a defendant
for the exercise of a constitutional right." Id. cmt. (n.1). While this comment could arguably
validate the Dunnigan court's holding that the enhancement is unconstitutional because it chills
the defendant's right to testify, the counter-argument would rely on the quote from Grayson
that "[t]here is no protected right to commit perjury" to explain that punishing defendant
perjury does not punish exercise of a constitutional right. Grayson, 438 U.S. at 54.
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refrain from enhancing sentences for perjury to avoid the trouble of
a trial on the merits of the criminal charge. Third, the enhancement
unreasonably chills the right of a defendant to testify if applied
whenever a defendant is found guilty after testifying on his or her
own behalf, without regard to whether the alleged perjury actually
obstructed justice.
If the perjury enhancement is not abandoned altogether and replaced with trials for perjury where appropriate, as the Fourth Circuit
suggests, its use should be modified to match the pre-Guidelines case
law regarding perjury that obstructs justice. At a minimum, a defendant's testimony, standing alone, should not be considered sufficient
for purposes of the enhancement because simple false testimony does
not rise to the level of an obstruction of justice as historically defined.
Enhancements for this type of perjury support the charge that the
court is using enhancement as a short cut to save judicial resources,
in violation of a defendant's due process rights.
Given the current application of the perjury enhancement, formal
perjury trials may only occur for non-defendant witnesses who testify
falsely or for false testimony before a grand jury. There simply is no
reason for a prosecutor to file a separate, subsequent charge of perjury
against a defendant alleged to have testified falsely. Consider three
facts from the prosecutor's perspective: first, the perjury enhancement
is mandatory in most circuits;241 second, the burden of proof at sentencing (the preponderance of the evidence standard) is lower than the
burden would be at trial on a separate perjury charge;?42 and, third,
the penalty assessed through enhancement approximates or exceeds
the penalty available under the perjury statute. m With enhancement
available for perjury, prosecutors have every incentive to abandon
separate perjury trials and simply wait for the pre-sentencing report
to suggest that a defendant committed perjury. Then, if the judge

241. See supra notes 196-211 and accompanying text.
242. See, e.g., United States v. Macklin, 927 F.2d 1272, 1280 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 112
S. Ct. 146 (1991); United States v. Restrepo, 946 F.2d 654, 656-57 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc);
United States v. Manor, 936 F.2d 1238, 1242 (11th Cir. 1991); United States v. Salmon, 948
F.2d 776, 778-79 (D.C. Cir. 1991); United States v. Smith, 918 F.2d 664, 669 (6th Cir. 1990),
cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1088 (1991); United States v. Dyer, 910 F.2d 530, 532 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 111 S. Ct. 276 (1990); United States v. Reid, 911 F.2d 1456, 1462 (10th Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, 111 S. Ct. 990 (1991); United States v. Wright, 873 F.2d 437, 441 (1st Cir. 1989); United
States v. Isom, 886 F.2d 736, 739 (4th Cir. 1989); United States v. Juarez-Ortega, 866 F.2d
747, 749 (5th Cir. 1989).
243. See supra notes 96-97 and accompanying text.
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agrees, the two-level enhancement, adding as much as six and one
half years to the sentence,24 would be applied.
Until the Fourth Circuit's decision in Dunnigan, the courts of
appeals applied the perjury enhancement somewhat uniformly. Now
that the Fourth Circuit has criticized the use of Grayson to support
the enhancement and has held such enhancement unconstitutional, the
Supreme Court will need to reconsider the Grayson analysis in light
of Congress' abandonment of rehabilitation as a purpose of incarceration. With additional critical examination, it appears that the Fourth
Circuit was premature in abandoning the enhancement altogether,
given the historical ability of courts to punish defendant perjury that
obstructs justice through the contempt power. If the Guidelines are
viewed as codifying this historic ability, then the perjury enhancement
can remain viable in situations where defendant perjury combines with
other factors in an effort to truly block the inquiry of the court. The
Fourth Circuit justifiably recoiled at the government's assertion that
enhancement is mandated whenever a defendant who testifies on his
own behalf is convicted. It is this type of extreme application that
should most frighten the Court and cause it to limit application of the
enhancement to situations where justice is truly obstructed.
William J. Hazzard**
244.

See supra note 96.

**Author's note: A draft of this note was made available to the Supreme Court prior to
publication. Subsequently, the Court announced its opinion in United States v. Dunnigan. United
States v. Dunnigan, 113 S. Ct. 1111 (1993), rev'g 944 F.2d 178 (4th Cir. 1991); see supra notes
141-69 and accompanying text. The Court overturned the Fourth Circuit's rejection of the
§ 3C1.1 enhancement for perjury and held that the Guidelines mandate an enhancement "[u]pon
a proper determination that the accused has committed perjury at trial." Dunnigan, 113 S. Ct.
at 1119. The Court rejected Dunnigan's arguments that application of the enhancement chills a
defendant's right to testify, id. at 1117, and that the enhancement merely serves as a surrogate
for a separate perjury prosecution. Id. at 1118-19.
Although the issue was not before the Court, the Court also addressed in dicta its historical
distinction between simple perjury and perjury that obstructs justice and the relevance of that
distinction in the context of the Guidelines. Id. at 1116; see supra Parts II.A and IV.B. Noting
that both Dunnigan and the government "assume the phrase 'impede or obstruct the administration of justice' includes perjury," Dunnigan, 113 S. Ct. at 1115, the Court acknowledged that
its decisions in both Ex Parte Hudgings, 249 U.S. 378 (1919), and In re Michael, 326 U.S. 224
(1945), "do not interpret perjury to constitute an obstruction of justice unless the perjury is
part of some greater design to interfere with judicial proceedings." Dunnigan, 113 S. Ct. at
1116; see supra notes 8-29 and accompanying text. Notwithstanding the historical distinction,
however, the Court indicated that, if the question were presented, it would defer to the Sentencing Commission's commentary to § 3C1.1 which equates perjury with obstruction in all instances.
Dunnigan, 113 S. Ct. at 1116.
The Court's dicta rejects the middle ground solution offered in this note by refusing to import
the distinction between perjury and obstruction of justice from the contempt of court context
into the sentencing arena. In doing so, the Court sent a clear message to criminal defendants:
testify at your peril.
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APPENDIX
SENTENCING TABLE2

(in months of imprisonment)
CRIMINAL HISTORY CATEGORY
(CRIMINAL HISTORY POINTS)
Offense
Level

I
(0 or 1)

II
(2 or 3)

III
(4, 5, 6)

IV
(7, 8, 9)

1
2
3

0-6
0-6
0-6

0-6
0-6
0-6

0-6
0-6
0-6

0-6
0-6
0-6

0-6
0-6
2-8

0-6
1-7
3-9

4
5
6

0-6
0-6
0-6

0-6
0-6
1-7

0-6
1-7
2-8

2-8
4-10
6-12

4-10
6-12
9-15

6-12
9-15
12-18

7
8
9

1-7
2-8
4-10

2-8
4-10
6-12

4-10
6-12
8-14

8-14
10-16
12-18

12-18
15-21
18-24

15-21
18-24
21-27

10
11
12

6-12
8-14
10-16

8-14
10-16
12-18

10-16
12-18
15-21

15-21
18-24
21-27

21-27
24-30
27-33

24-30
27-33
30-37

13
14
15

12-18
15 -21
18-24

15-21
18 -24
21-27

18-24
21-27
24-30

24-30
27-33
30-37

30-37
33-41
37-46

33-41
37-46
41-51

16
17
18

21-27
24-30
27-33

24-30
27-33
30-37

27-33
30-37
33-41

33-41
37-46
41-51

41-51
46-57
51-63

46-57
51-63
57-71

19
20
21

30-37
33-41
37-46

33-41
37-46
41-51

37-46
41-51
46-57

46-57
51-63
57-71

57-71
63-78
70-87

63-78
70-87
77-96

22
23
24

41-51
46-57
51-63

46-57
51-63
57-71

51-63
57-71
63-78

63-78
70-87
77-96

77-96
84-105
92-115

84-105
92-115
100-125

25
26
27

57-71
63-78
70-87

63-78
70-87
78-97

70-87
78-97
87-108

84-105
92-115
100-125

100-125
110-137
120-150

110-137
120-150
130-162

28
29
30

78-97
87-108
97-121

87-108
97-121
108-135

97-121
108-135
121-151

110-137
121-151
135-168

130-162
140-175
151-188

140-175
151-188
168-210

108-135
121-151

121-151
135-168

135-168
151-188

151-188
168-210

168-210
188-235

188-235
210-262
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SENTENCING TABLE (Continued)
(in months of imprisonment)
CRIMINAL HISTORY CATEGORY
(CRIMINAL HISTORY POINTS)
V

VI

Offense

I

II

III

IV

Level

(0 or 1)

(2 or 3)

(4, 5, 6)

(7, 8, 9)

33

135-168

151-188

168-210

188-235

210-262

235-293

34
35
36

151-188
168-210
188-235

168-210
188-235
210-262

188-235
210-262
235-293

210-262
235-293
262-327

235-293
262-327
292-365

262-327
292-365
324-405

37
38
39

210-262
235-293
262-327

235-293
262-327
292-365

262-327
292-365
324-405

292-365
324-405
360 - life

324-405
360 - life
360 - life

360 -life
360 - life
360 - life

40
41
42

292-365
324-405
360 - life

324-405
360 - life
360 - life

360 - life
360 - life
360 - life

360 - life
360 - life
360 - life

360 - life
360 - life
360 - life

360 - life
360 - life
360 - life
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life

life

life

life

life

life

(10, 11, 12) (13 or more)

2U.S.S.G. ch. 5, pt. A.
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